Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupAPT42 | APT42 has masqueraded the VINETHORN payload as a VPN application. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupAPT5 | APT5 has named exfiltration archives to mimic Windows Updates at times using filenames with a `KB<digits>.zip` pattern. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupFox Kitten | Fox Kitten has named binaries and configuration files svhost and dllhost respectively to appear legitimate. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has disguised malicious executables to appear as legitimate files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has renamed malicious code to disguise it as Microsoft's narrator and other legitimate files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupINC Ransom | INC Ransom has named a PsExec executable winupd to mimic a legitimate Windows update file. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca used the command `move [file path] c:\windows\system32\spool\prtprocs\x64\spool.dll` to move and register a malicious DLL name as a Windows print processor, which eventually was loaded by the Print Spooler service. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupSilence | Silence has named its backdoor "WINWORD.exe". |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupSowbug | Sowbug named its tools to masquerade as Windows or Adobe Reader software, such as by using the file name adobecms.exe and the directory |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupVelvet Ant | Velvet Ant used a malicious DLL, `iviewers.dll`, that mimics the legitimate "OLE/COM Object Viewer" within Windows. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupTransparent Tribe | Transparent Tribe can mimic legitimate Windows directories by using the same icons and names. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupVOID MANTICORE | VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded malicious payloads to resemble legitimate applications. VOID MANTICORE has leveraged malicious payloads that use nomenclature associated with common applications that include Pictory, KeePass, WhatsApp, and Telegram. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupPROMETHIUM | PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupWIRTE | WIRTE has used security service provider naming conventions such as ESET and Kasperky ("Kaspersky Update Agent") in order to appear legitimate. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used `dllhost.exe` to mask Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) and `MicrosoftOutLookUpdater.exe` for Plink. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has masqueraded WAR files to look like legitimate packages such as, wsexample.war, wsexamples.com, examples.war, and exampl3s.war. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupTeamPCP | TeamPCP has cloned GitHub commit metadata including the author name, email, committer, and timestamps to use for impostor commits. TeamPCP has also used legitimate file names such as msbuild.exe and ringtone.wav to mask malicious payloads. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has disguised MeshCentral agent binaries as Microsoft Azure services, e.g. meshagent32-azure-ops.exe, meshagent64-azure-ops.exe, and meshagent64-v2.exe. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has named malicious payloads as benign-looking executables to blend in the environment including Run keys, npm packages, and JavaScript utilities often using names mirroring Apple, Windows, or other native system files. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupThe Gentlemen | The Gentlemen has named The Gentlemen Ransomware payload files to resemble well-known software vendors to include security vendors. The Gentlemen has also utilized icons that match impersonated vendors. |
| T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has masqueraded as legitimate software. NIMBUS MANTICORE has also mimicked legitimate installers to include Zoom. |
| T1036.006 Space after Filename |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has put several spaces before a file extension to avoid detection and suspicion. |
| T1036.007 Double File Extension |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has used an additional filename extension to hide the true file type. Kimsuky has also masqueraded malicious LNK files as PDF objects using the double extension .pdf.lnk. |
| T1036.007 Double File Extension |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has used an additional filename extension to hide the true file type. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
GroupBlackByte | BlackByte masqueraded configuration files containing encryption keys as PNG files. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
GroupVolt Typhoon | Volt Typhoon has appended copies of the ntds.dit database with a .gif file extension. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has masqueraded malicious executables as legitimate files that download PlugX malware. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
GroupMirrorFace | MirrorFace has crafted malware payloads to appear as Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) files. |
| T1036.008 Masquerade File Type |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has configured malware to rename malicious payloads with naming conventions that reduce a chance of detection to include renaming “package.md” to “package.json”. |
| T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name |
GroupAPT3 | APT3 has been known to create or enable accounts, such as |
| T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name |
GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has created accounts disguised as legitimate backup and service accounts as well as an email administration account. |
| T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name |
GroupStorm-1811 | Storm-1811 has created Microsoft Teams accounts that spoof IT support and helpdesk members for use in application and voice phishing. |
| T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has created local accounts named `help` and `DefaultAccount` on compromised machines. |
| T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts |
GroupAPT41 | APT41 used a hidden shell script in `/etc/rc.d/init.d` to leverage the `ADORE.XSEC`backdoor and `Adore-NG` rootkit. |
| T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts |
GroupRocke | Rocke has installed an "init.d" startup script to maintain persistence. |
| T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has attempted to bypass digital signature verification checks at startup by adding a command to the startup config `/etc/init.d/localnet` within the rootfs.gz archive of both FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer devices. |
| T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has hijacked legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable malware to execute on system startup. |
| T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows) |
GroupAPT28 | An APT28 loader Trojan adds the Registry key |
| T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows) |
GroupCobalt Group | Cobalt Group has added persistence by registering the file name for the next stage malware under |
| T1037.004 RC Scripts |
GroupUNC3886 | UNC3886 has placed a bash installation script into `/etc/rc.local.d/` to establish persistence. |
| T1037.004 RC Scripts |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has installed a run command on a compromised system to enable malware execution on system startup. |
| T1037.004 RC Scripts |
GroupVelvet Ant | Velvet Ant used a modified `/etc/rc.local` file on compromised F5 BIG-IP devices to maintain persistence. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupmenuPass | menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupGamaredon Group | Gamaredon Group malware has collected Microsoft Office documents from mapped network drives. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupRedCurl | RedCurl has collected data about network drives. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupChimera | Chimera has collected data of interest from network shares. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupBRONZE BUTLER | BRONZE BUTLER has exfiltrated files stolen from file shares. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 has collected files from network shared drives. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupFox Kitten | Fox Kitten has searched network shares to access sensitive documents. |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive |
GroupSowbug | Sowbug extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.