Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1110.002 Password Cracking |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code with cracking database password hashes of the victim organizations. |
| T1110.003 Password Spraying |
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign | During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 performed password-spray attacks against public facing services to validate credentials. |
| T1110.003 Password Spraying |
CampaignQuad7 Activity | Quad7 Activity has conducted a throttled variant of password spraying techniques that only utilized a single attempt to sign in within a 24-hour time period, eluding brute force detection thresholds. |
| T1110.003 Password Spraying |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to attempt to password spray several database servers. During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary has also instructed Claude Code to attempt to password spray a SCADA web interface. |
| T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom collection method to intercept two-factor authentication soft tokens. |
| T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan abused compromised appliance access to collect multifactor authentication token values during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, disabled security services via Registry modifications. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that modified registry keys. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching `rundll32.exe`, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. . |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and manipulate the Registry. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, the threat actors enabled Wdigest by changing the `HKLM\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest` registry value from 0 (disabled) to 1 (enabled). |
| T1113 Screen Capture |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries captured screenshots of devices using |
| T1114.001 Local Email Collection |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used RAT malware to exfiltrate email archives. |
| T1114.002 Remote Email Collection |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors made multiple HTTP POST requests to the Exchange servers of the victim organization to transfer data. |
| T1114.002 Remote Email Collection |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 collected emails from specific individuals, such as executives and IT staff, using `New-MailboxExportRequest` followed by `Get-MailboxExportRequest`. |
| T1114.002 Remote Email Collection |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged stolen credentials within cloud services to gather data and email messages from Exchange services related to OT topics and technical work carried out within organizations. |
| T1115 Clipboard Data |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected clipboard data in plaintext. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used a command shell to automatically iterate through web.config files to expose and collect machineKey settings. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to automatically collect and process large volumes of data from without human direction. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included collection of packet capture and system configuration information. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignAPT41 DUST | APT41 DUST used tools such as SQLULDR2 and PINEGROVE to gather local system and database information. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a script to collect information about the infected system. |
| T1119 Automated Collection |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to automate data extraction jobs across multiple databases as a background process. |
| T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `fsutil fsinfo drives` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered removable disks attached to a system. |
| T1124 System Time Discovery |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net view /all time` to gather the local time of a compromised network. |
| T1124 System Time Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net time` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1124 System Time Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the `time` command to retrieve the current time of a compromised system. |
| T1127.001 MSBuild |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file. |
| T1127.001 MSBuild |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used MSBuild to compile and execute its FaceXInjector injection tool. |
| T1132.001 Standard Encoding |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a VBS script to send the Base64-encoded name of the compromised computer to C2. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as the backdoor to target systems. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used VPN access to persist in the victim environment. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised identities to access networks via SSH, VPNs, and other remote access tools. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: `cscript //nologo "C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener="true"}`. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor used WebVPN sessions commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services to communicate to compromised devices. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, threat actors leveraged the FortiGate VPN interface that was exposed to the internet to gain access to the victim environment. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used stolen credentials to connect to the victim's network via VPN. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used Citrix and VPNs to persist in compromised environments. |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
CampaignCostaRicto | During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote tunneling using an SSH tool to maintain access to a compromised environment. |
| T1134 Access Token Manipulation |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privilege escalation. |
| T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft |
CampaignHomeLand Justice | During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used custom tooling to acquire tokens using `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser/SetThreadToken`. |
| T1135 Network Share Discovery |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares. |
| T1135 Network Share Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net share` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance. |
| T1135 Network Share Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat. |
| T1135 Network Share Discovery |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan scanned and enumerated remote network shares in victim environments during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1136 Create Account |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team added a login to a SQL Server with `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin`. |
| T1136.001 Local Account |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to create a local backdoor account to maintain access. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.