Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used domain administrators' accounts to help facilitate lateral movement on compromised networks. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used compromised domain administrator credentials as part of their lateral movement. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised credentials for lateral movement. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, threat actors utilized privileged accounts to access the FortiGate VPN solution and subsequent subnets. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used domain accounts to gain further access to victim systems. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation. |
| T1078.002 Domain Accounts |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan compromised domain credentials during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to test credentials harvested against discovered devices. |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised local accounts to access victims' networks. |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation. |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan used captured local account information, such as service accounts, for actions during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1078.003 Local Accounts |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to connect to the victim environments using compromised local accounts to include root and service accounts. |
| T1078.004 Cloud Accounts |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal. |
| T1078.004 Cloud Accounts |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged stolen credentials from on-premises environments to access cloud services. |
| T1078.004 Cloud Accounts |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity includes use of native system tools, such as |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors fingerprinted targeted SharePoint servers to identify OS version and running processes. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignFrankenstein | During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain the compromised machine's name. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations | Mustang Panda captured victim operating system type via User Agent analysis during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors collected the computer name, OS, and other system information using `cmd /c systeminfo > %temp%\ temp.ini`. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignCutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the ENUM4LINUX Perl script for discovery on Windows and Samba hosts. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary tasked Claude Code to query databases and systems in order to identify proprietary information, including system configurations and database types. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignJuicy Mix | During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a script to send the name of the compromised host via HTTP `POST` to register it with C2. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace collected system information. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignFunnyDream | During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Systeminfo to collect information on targeted hosts. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `systeminfo` command to gather details about a compromised system. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included collection of victim device configuration information. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered the OS versions of systems connected to a targeted network. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan performed host enumeration and data gathering operations on victim machines during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to identify system information using `hostname`. During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code with using CrackMapExec to discover configuration information about the domain controllers. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted word searches within documents on a compromised host in search of security and financial matters. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignKV Botnet Activity | KV Botnet Activity gathers a list of filenames from the following locations during execution of the final botnet stage: |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignSharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors leveraged commands to locate accessible file shares, backup paths, or SharePoint content. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignOperation Honeybee | During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a malicious DLL to search for files with specific keywords. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary leveraged Claude Code to identify sensitive data within the victim environment for extraction. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors conducted a file listing discovery against multiple hosts to ensure locker encryption was successful. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained information about the configured Exchange virtual directory using `Get-WebServicesVirtualDirectory`. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace enumerated file system details in compromised environments. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `dir c:\\` to search for files. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignSalesforce Data Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors queried customers' Salesforce environments to identify sensitive information for exfiltration. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries obtained the contents of users’ directories using `dir /s /b C:\Users` command. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and browse the victim file system. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors gathered a recursive directory listing to find files and directories of interest. |
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to use the `ls -la` command to list files and directories in the current working directory. |
| T1087 Account Discovery |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to query internal database user account tables to enumerate accounts and identify high-privilege accounts within compromised environments. |
| T1087 Account Discovery |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained a list of users and their roles from an Exchange server using `Get-ManagementRoleAssignment`. |
| T1087 Account Discovery |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary tasked Claude Code to attempt to discover accounts by cycling through relative identifiers (RIDs). |
| T1087.001 Local Account |
CampaignOperation Digital Eye | During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local.exe tool to view local account information. |
| T1087.001 Local Account |
CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net user` command to gather account information. |
| T1087.002 Domain Account |
CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group queried compromised victim's active directory servers to obtain the list of employees including administrator accounts. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.