Procedure examples

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Task Manager to dump LSASS memory from Windows devices to disk.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors accessed and mounted virtual hard disk backups to extract
ntds.dit.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors stole the running configuration and cache data from targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors moved laterally using compromised credentials to connect to internal Windows systems with SMB.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used SSH for lateral movement.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used a Base64-encoded Python script to write a patched version of the Ivanti Connect Secure `dsls` binary.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used malicious SparkGateway plugins to inject shared objects into web process memory on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to enable deployment of backdoors.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified a JavaScript file on the Web SSL VPN component of Ivanti Connect Secure devices to keylog credentials.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified the JavaScript loaded by the Ivanti Connect Secure login page to capture credentials entered.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Perl scripts to enable the deployment of the THINSPOOL shell script dropper and for enumerating host data.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used a Python reverse shell and the PySoxy SOCKS5 proxy tool.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors cleared logs to remove traces of their activity and restored compromised systems to a clean state to bypass manufacturer mitigations for CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors deleted `/tmp/test1.txt` on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs which was used to hold stolen configuration and cache files.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors changed timestamps of multiple files on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to conceal malicious activity.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used DNS to tunnel IPv4 C2 traffic.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts for lateral movement on targeted networks.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the ENUM4LINUX Perl script for discovery on Windows and Samba hosts.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the Unix socket and a reverse TCP shell for C2 communications.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors leveraged exploits to download remote files to Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors exploited CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances to enable authentication bypass and command injection. A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, CVE-2024-21893, was identified later and used to bypass mitigations for the initial two vulnerabilities by chaining with CVE-2024-21887.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors sent a magic 48-byte sequence to enable the PITSOCK backdoor to communicate via the `/tmp/clientsDownload.sock` socket.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used multiple web shells to maintain presence on compromised Connect Secure appliances such as WIREFIRE, GLASSTOKEN, BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and FRAMESTING.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors trojanized legitimate files in Ivanti Connect Secure appliances with malicious code.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors saved collected data to a tar archive.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Iodine to tunnel IPv4 traffic over DNS.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors leveraged tools including Interactsh to identify vulnerable targets, PySoxy to simultaneously dispatch traffic between multiple endpoints, BusyBox to enable post exploitation activities, and Kubo Injector to inject shared objects into process memory.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors peformed reconnaissance of victims' internal websites via proxied connections.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the publicly available Interactsh tool to identify Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs vulnerable to CVE-2024-21893.

During Cutting Edge, threat actors disabled logging and modified the `compcheckresult.cgi` component to edit the Ivanti Connect Secure built-in Integrity Checker exclusion list to evade detection.