Windows Suspicious File in EFI Volume

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Suspicious File in EFI Volume
id:4000d728-faaf-44d4-969b-12216f2879e1
version:2
date:None
author:Raven Tait, Splunk
status:production
type:TTP
Description:Detects data files in the EFI volume. This is sometimes indicative of an actor attempting to bypass secure boot through vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-7344. These use vulnerable boot loaders to run malicious system firmware code.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 11
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where

Filesystem.file_path="*\\EFI\\Boot\\*"
Filesystem.file_path="*.dat"

by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_path
Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name
Filesystem.action Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_file_in_efi_volume_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Some legitimate system or firmware update processes may create or modify files in the EFI volume. Review alerts carefully to distinguish between normal maintenance and suspicious activity.
References:
  -https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/under-cloak-uefi-secure-boot-introducing-cve-2024-7344/
  -https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hybridpetya-ransomware-can-bypass-uefi-secure-boot/
drilldown_searches:
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 earliest_offset:'7d'
 latest_offset:'0'
analytic_story:['BlackLotus Campaign', 'Windows BootKits', 'Sandworm Tools']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1542.001', 'T1490']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1542.001/snapattack/snapattack.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None