Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer
id:2d4470ef-7158-4b47-b68b-1f7f16382156
version:14
date:None
author:Steven Dick, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status:production
type:Anomaly
Description:This analytic detects selected system, scripting, discovery, and administration utilities spawned by Windows web or application server processes. Parent processes include common web server and application server services; Java and JavaW parents are included when their command lines identify known server frameworks or applications. Unexpected child process activity may indicate that an exposed application or web server has been abused to run commands on the host. Review the parent command line, child process, user, and surrounding activity to determine whether the behavior is authorized.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count max(_time) as lastTime
min(_time) as firstTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process_name IN (
"apache*.exe",
"beasvc.exe",
"caddy.exe",
"coldfusion.exe",
"frankenphp.exe",
"http*.exe",
"iisexpress.exe",
"java.exe",
"javaw.exe",
"jbosssvc.exe",
"jrun.exe",
"lighttpd.exe",
"lsphp*.exe",
"nginx*.exe",
"openresty.exe",
"php*.exe",
"roadrunner.exe",
"tomcat*.exe",
"traefik.exe",
"UMWorkerProcess.exe",
"w3wp.exe",
"wildfly-service.exe",
"ws_TomcatService.exe"
)
NOT Processes.parent_process_name IN ("phpstorm*")

Processes.process_name IN (
"adfind.exe", "arp.exe", "at.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certreq.exe", "certutil.exe", "cmdkey.exe",
"cscript.exe", "curl.exe", "dnscmd.exe", "dsget.exe", "dsquery.exe", "find.exe", "findstr.exe",
"fsutil.exe", "getmac.exe", "hostname.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "klist.exe", "mshta.exe",
"nbtstat.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe", "netdom.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe",
"nslookup.exe", "ntdsutil.exe", "pathping.exe", "perl.exe", "ping.exe", "python.exe",
"qprocess.exe", "query.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "reg.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "route.exe",
"rundll32.exe", "sc.exe", "schtasks.exe", "scrcons.exe", "setspn.exe", "systeminfo.exe",
"tasklist.exe", "tracert.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe", "wget.exe", "whoami.exe",
"wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "wusa.exe"
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`

```Keep Java and JavaW parents only when their command line identifies a known web or application server.```

| where (
NOT match(parent_process_name, "(?i)^javaw?(\.exe)?$")
OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.apache\.catalina\.startup\.Bootstrap|-Dcatalina\.base=|org\.eclipse\.jetty\.start\.Main|-Djetty\.home=|org\.jboss\.modules\.Main|-Djboss\.home\.dir=|weblogic\.Server|-Dweblogic\.Name=|weblogic-launcher\.jar|com\.ibm\.ws\.runtime\.WsServer|com\.ibm\.ws\.kernel\.boot\.cmdline\.Bootstrap|com\.sun\.enterprise\.glassfish\.bootstrap\.ASMain|com\.caucho\.server\.resin\.Resin)")
OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.springframework\.boot\.loader\.|quarkus-run\.jar|io\.quarkus\.runner\.GeneratedMain|io\.micronaut\.runtime\.Micronaut|io\.dropwizard\.cli\.ServerCommand|play\.core\.server\.ProdServerStart|io\.helidon\.microprofile\.server\.Main|io\.helidon\.webserver|io\.vertx\.core\.Launcher)")
OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.keycloak|org\.apereo\.cas|org\.elasticsearch\.bootstrap\.Elasticsearch|com\.atlassian\.jira\.startup\.Launcher|BitbucketServerLauncher|com\.google\.gerrit\.pgm\.Daemon|-Dsolr\.solr\.home=|jenkins\.war)")
)

| where NOT (
process_name="tasklist.exe"
AND match(
lower(process),
"^\"?tasklist(\.exe)?\"? +/fi +\"pid eq [0-9]+\" *$"
)
)

| where NOT (
(
match(parent_process_path, "(?i)^C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Datacard\\\\AppContainer\\\\bin\\\\tomcat.*\.exe$")
AND process_name="reg.exe"
AND match(
process,
"(?i)^reg query \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\(SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Print\\\\Printers|SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors)"
)
)
OR
(
match(parent_process_path, "(?i)^E:\\\\Program Files\\\\AeroScout\\\\MobileView\\\\services\\\\.*\\\\tomcat9\.exe$")
AND process_name="sc.exe"
AND match(process, "(?i)^sc qc (mv_[a-z-]+|mobileviewhttpserver)( [0-9]+)?$")
)
)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_child_process_spawned_from_webserver_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
References:
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
  -https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
  -https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
drilldown_searches:
 name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 earliest_offset:'7d'
 latest_offset:'0'
analytic_story:['BlackByte Ransomware', 'CISA AA22-257A', 'CISA AA22-264A', 'Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489', 'Compromised Windows Host', 'Flax Typhoon', 'GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor', 'HAFNIUM Group', 'Medusa Ransomware', 'Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities', 'Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287', 'PHP2Shell', 'ProxyNotShell', 'ProxyShell', 'SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability', 'WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1505.003']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None