Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist
id:09d88404-1e29-46cb-806c-1eedbc85ad5d
version:9
date:None
author:Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows OS tool klist.exe, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process details. Monitoring klist.exe is significant as it can indicate attempts to list or gather cached Kerberos tickets, which are crucial for lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to move laterally within the network or escalate privileges, posing a severe security risk.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name="klist.exe"
OR
Processes.original_file_name = "klist.exe" Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_steal_or_forge_kerberos_tickets_klist_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:No false positives have been identified at this time.
References:
  -https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/winPEAS
  -https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/
drilldown_searches:
  :
analytic_story:['Windows Post-Exploitation', 'Prestige Ransomware']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1558']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/winpeas/sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None