Name:Windows SSH Proxy Command id:ac520039-21f1-4567-b528-5b7133dba76f version:4 date:2026-03-10 author:Michael Haag, AJ King, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk, Jesse Hunter, Splunk Community Contributor status:production type:Anomaly Description:This detection identifies potential abuse of SSH "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" by monitoring for suspicious process execution patterns.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Legitimate use of SSH ProxyCommand or LocalCommand with scripting engines may trigger this detection.
Filter as needed based on your environment's normal SSH usage patterns and authorized scripting activities.
References: -https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c33f82868dbbfc3ab03918f430b1a348499f5baf047b136ff0a4fc3e8addaa9b/detection -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/ -https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ssh/ -https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config#ProxyCommand -https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config#LocalCommand drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' tags: analytic_story: - 'ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows Shortcut Exploit Abused as Zero-Day' - 'Living Off The Land' - 'Hellcat Ransomware' asset_type:Endpoint mitre_attack_id: - 'T1572' - 'T1059.001' - 'T1105' product: - 'Splunk Enterprise' - 'Splunk Enterprise Security' - 'Splunk Cloud' security_domain:endpoint