Name:Windows PsTools Recon Usage id:9a5f4b3e-1d2b-4c6f-9a8e-3b7d2f5c1a6e version:6 date:None author:Nasreddine Bencherchali status:production type:Anomaly Description:The following analytic identifies execution of Sysinternals PsTools and Sysinternals Suit binaries that are commonly used for reconnaissance and information gathering on
Windows endpoints.
PsTools (PsExec, PsFile, PsGetSid, PsInfo, PsPing, etc.) or Sysinternals Suit tools, are frequently used by administrators for legitimate maintenance but are also leveraged by threat actors to collect system, account, network and service information during discovery and lateral movement.
This detection focuses on process execution and PE metadata telemetry (OriginalFileName).
If confirmed malicious, this activity can indicate targeted reconnaissance and foothold escalation, enabling subsequent lateral movement or credential abuse.
Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
-CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Legitimate administrators commonly use PsTools for troubleshooting and management.
False positives are likely in environments where PsTools are an approved operational toolset, or where automated management systems invoke them.
Tune by whitelisting approved management hosts, service accounts, and scheduled maintenance windows.
References: -https://learn.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/pstools -https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections/raw/master/2015/2015.09.17.Operation_Iron_Tiger/wp-operation-iron-tiger.pdf -https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/Report2018OverwatchReport.pdf drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Compromised Windows Host']
