Windows Odbcconf Hunting

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Odbcconf Hunting
id:0562ad4b-fdaa-4882-b12f-7b8e0034cd72
version:4
date:2024-10-17
author:Michael Haag, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic identifies the execution of Odbcconf.exe within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the process name is Odbcconf.exe. This activity is significant because Odbcconf.exe can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands or load malicious DLLs, potentially leading to code execution or persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain access to the system, execute further malicious activities, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the environment.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_odbcconf_hunting_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:False positives will be present as this is meant to assist with filtering and tuning.
References:
  -https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/odbcconf.exe-07FBA12552331355C103999806627314.html
  -https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1541838407894171650?s=20&t=kp3WBPtfnyA3xW7D7wx0uw
drilldown_searches:
  :
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Living Off The Land'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  confidence:20
  impact:30
  message:An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to circumvent controls.
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1218.008'
  observable:
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'dest'
    type:'Hostname'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'parent_process_name'
    type:'Process'
    - role:
      - 'Attacker'
    name:'process_name'
    type:'Process Name'
    - role:
      - 'Attacker'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'Processes.dest'
    - 'Processes.user'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_name'
    - 'Processes.parent_process'
    - 'Processes.original_file_name'
    - 'Processes.process_name'
    - 'Processes.process'
    - 'Processes.process_id'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_path'
    - 'Processes.process_path'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_id'
  risk_score:6
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.008/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon-odbc-regsvr.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
  update_timestamp: True
manual_test:None

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