Name:Windows NetSupport RMM DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process id:125f96f9-6f34-418b-b868-c4a8d7fb865f version:1 date:2025-11-20 author:Teoderick Contreras, Splunk status:production type:Anomaly Description:The following analytic detects the loading of specific dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) associated with the NetSupport Remote Manager (RMM) tool by any process on a Windows system.
Modules such as CryptPak.dll, HTCTL32.DLL, IPCTL32.DLL, keyshowhook.dll, pcicapi.DLL, PCICL32.DLL, and TCCTL32.DLL, are integral to NetSupport's functionality.
This detection is particularly valuable when these modules are loaded by processes running from unusual directories (e.g., Downloads, ProgramData, or user-specific folders) rather than the legitimate Program Files installation path, or by executables that have been renamed but retain the internal "client32" identifier.
This helps to identify instances where the legitimate NetSupport tool is being misused by adversaries as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 7
search:`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ( "*\\CryptPak.dll", "*\\HTCTL32.DLL", "*\\pcicapi.dll", "*\\pcichek.dll", "*\\PCICL32.DLL", "*\\TCCTL32.DLL" ) NOT Image IN ("C:\\Program Files\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") Signature = "NetSupport Ltd*" | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_netsupport_rmm_dll_loaded_by_uncommon_process_filter`
how_to_implement:To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and ImageLoaded executions from your endpoints.
If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives:NetSupport RMM installations outside of the standard Program Files directory will trigger this detection.
Apply appropriate filters to exclude known legitimate installations.
References: -https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_cybersecurity-incidentresponse-dfir-activity-7394805779448418304-g0gZ?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAuFTjIB5weY_kcyu4qp3kHbI4v49tO0zEk -https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/ -https://www.esentire.com/blog/evalusion-campaign-delivers-amatera-stealer-and-netsupport-rat drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' tags: analytic_story: - 'NetSupport RMM Tool Abuse' asset_type:Endpoint mitre_attack_id: - 'T1036' product: - 'Splunk Enterprise' - 'Splunk Enterprise Security' - 'Splunk Cloud' security_domain:endpoint
