Name:Windows LOLBAS Executed Outside Expected Path id:326fdf44-b90c-4d2e-adca-1fd140b10536 version:5 date:2025-02-10 author:Steven Dick status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic identifies a LOLBAS process being executed outside of it's expected location. Processes being executed outside of expected locations may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` latest(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process, latest(Processes.process) as process, latest(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid count, min(_time) AS firstTime, max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process != "unknown" AND NOT Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Program Files*","*\\PROGRA~*","*\\Windows\\System32\\*","*\\Windows\\Syswow64\\*") by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup lolbas_file_path lolbas_file_name as process_name OUTPUT description as desc | lookup lolbas_file_path lolbas_file_name as process_name lolbas_file_path as process_path OUTPUT description as is_lolbas_path | search desc!="false" AND is_lolbas_path="false" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_lolbas_executed_outside_expected_path_filter`
how_to_implement:To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process name and process path, such as with Sysmon EID 1. known_false_positives:Vendors will often copy system exectables to a different path for application usage. References: -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/ drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' tags: analytic_story: - 'Living Off The Land' - 'Masquerading - Rename System Utilities' - 'Windows Defense Evasion Tactics' asset_type:Endpoint mitre_attack_id: - 'T1036.005' - 'T1218.011' product: - 'Splunk Enterprise' - 'Splunk Enterprise Security' - 'Splunk Cloud' security_domain:endpoint
