Windows Group Discovery Via Net

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Group Discovery Via Net
id:c5c8e0f3-147a-43da-bf04-4cfaec27dc44
version:2
date:2025-02-10
author:Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query global, local and domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local or domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory or privileged accounts discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` Processes.process="*group*" AND NOT (Processes.process="*/add" OR Processes.process="*/delete") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_group_discovery_via_net_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
References:
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
  -https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
  -https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
  -https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
  :
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Windows Post-Exploitation'
    - 'Active Directory Discovery'
    - 'Prestige Ransomware'
    - 'Graceful Wipe Out Attack'
    - 'Rhysida Ransomware'
    - 'Cleo File Transfer Software'
    - 'Volt Typhoon'
    - 'IcedID'
    - 'Windows Discovery Techniques'
    - 'Azorult'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1069.001'
    - 'T1069.002'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.002/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
manual_test:None