Windows For Loop Usage Within Cmd.exe To Execute Commands

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows For Loop Usage Within Cmd.exe To Execute Commands
id:a4ce9079-fc8f-4749-982a-13197c8cf977
version:1
date:None
author:Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status:production
type:Anomaly
Description:The following analytic identifies the use of a `for /f` loop with the `delims=` option within `cmd.exe`, a technique commonly used to parse and extract data from the output of other commands. Adversaries and malicious scripts leverage this pattern to programmatically process command output for discovery, data extraction, or execution purposes while evading simpler detection logic.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process="*for /f*"
Processes.parent_process="*delims=*"
NOT Processes.user="SYSTEM"
NOT Processes.user="*$"
NOT Processes.parent_process IN (
"*__VIARelease*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*",
"*^| findstr *"
)

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id
Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_for_loop_usage_within_cmd_exe_to_execute_commands_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Administrators or power users may use `for /f` loops with `delims=` in legitimate scripts for automation or troubleshooting purposes.
References:
  -https://packetwatch.com/resources/threat-profile/clickfix-abuses-finger-to-deliver-castleloader
drilldown_searches:
 name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 earliest_offset:'7d'
 latest_offset:'0'
analytic_story:['Compromised Windows Host', 'Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns', 'Living Off The Land', 'Suspicious Command-Line Executions', 'Windows Post-Exploitation']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1059.003']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.003/cmd_for_loop/cmd_for_loop.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None