Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path
id:fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122
version:4
date:2024-09-30
author:Michael Haag, Splunk
status:production
type:TTP
Description:The following analytic detects the execution of native .NET binaries from non-standard directories within the Windows operating system. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, comparing process names and original file names against a predefined lookup using the `is_net_windows_file_macro` macro. This activity is significant because adversaries may move .NET binaries to unconventional paths to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `is_net_windows_file_macro`
| `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.
References:
  -https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.yaml
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/
  -https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
  -https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md
drilldown_searches:
name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Masquerading - Rename System Utilities'
    - 'Ransomware'
    - 'Unusual Processes'
    - 'Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil'
    - 'Data Destruction'
    - 'WhisperGate'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  confidence:70
  impact:70
  message:An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ from a non-standard path was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1036'
    - 'T1036.003'
    - 'T1218'
    - 'T1218.004'
  observable:
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'dest'
    type:'Hostname'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'parent_process_name'
    type:'Process'
    - role:
      - 'Attacker'
    name:'process_name'
    type:'Process'
    - role:
      - 'Attacker'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'Processes.dest'
    - 'Processes.user'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_name'
    - 'Processes.parent_process'
    - 'Processes.original_file_name'
    - 'Processes.process_name'
    - 'Processes.process'
    - 'Processes.process_id'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_path'
    - 'Processes.process_path'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_id'
  risk_score:49
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.004/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_installutil_path.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
manual_test:None