Name:Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl id:f39ee679-3b1e-4f47-841c-5c3c580acda2 version:5 date:2024-11-28 author:Michael Haag, Splunk status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects DLL search order hijacking involving iscsicpl.exe. It identifies when iscsicpl.exe loads a malicious DLL from a new path, triggering the payload execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on child processes spawned by iscsicpl.exe. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential attempt to execute unauthorized code via DLL hijacking. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
-CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=iscsicpl.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_with_iscsicpl_filter`
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. known_false_positives:False positives may be present, filtering may be required. Remove the Windows Shells macro to determine if other utilities are using iscsicpl.exe. References: -https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC -https://github.com/422926799/csplugin/tree/master/bypassUAC drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' tags: analytic_story: - 'Living Off The Land' - 'Compromised Windows Host' - 'Windows Defense Evasion Tactics' asset_type:Endpoint confidence:80 impact:80 message:An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to elevate access. mitre_attack_id: - 'T1574.001' observable: name:'user' type:'User' - role: - 'Victim' name:'dest' type:'Hostname' - role: - 'Victim' name:'parent_process_name' type:'Process' - role: - 'Attacker' name:'process_name' type:'Process' - role: - 'Attacker' product: - 'Splunk Enterprise' - 'Splunk Enterprise Security' - 'Splunk Cloud' required_fields: - '_time' - 'Processes.dest' - 'Processes.user' - 'Processes.parent_process_name' - 'Processes.parent_process' - 'Processes.original_file_name' - 'Processes.process_name' - 'Processes.process' - 'Processes.process_id' - 'Processes.parent_process_path' - 'Processes.process_path' - 'Processes.parent_process_id' risk_score:64 security_domain:endpoint
