Windows DiskCryptor Usage

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows DiskCryptor Usage
id:d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122
version:9
date:None
author:Michael Haag, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic detects the execution of DiskCryptor, identified by the process names "dcrypt.exe" or "dcinst.exe". This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. DiskCryptor is significant because adversaries use it to manually encrypt disks during an operation, potentially leading to data inaccessibility. If confirmed malicious, this activity could result in complete disk encryption, causing data loss and operational disruption. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate potential ransomware attacks.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.process_name="dcrypt.exe"
OR
Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.
References:
  -https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
  -https://github.com/DavidXanatos/DiskCryptor
drilldown_searches:
  :
analytic_story:['Ransomware']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1486']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1486/dcrypt/windows-sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None

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