Name:Windows CMD Evasive Patterns Through Native Commands id:e4202c26-f5d1-4c72-91f7-e551338be9a4 version:1 date:None author:Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk status:production type:Anomaly Description:The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to evade defenses with nothing but built-in commands, a pattern frequently seen in ClickFix-style social engineering and malware loader activity.
Adversaries abuse native cmd.exe features such as call combined with variable assignment to assemble commands piece by piece, hiding the real payload from static inspection and string-based detections.
They also chain native utilities such as timeout and del to erase the dropped executable shortly after it has run, which removes evidence and complicates forensic analysis.
Because these techniques need no additional tooling, they let attackers blend into routine command shell activity.
If confirmed malicious, this could indicate a staged loader concealing its intent or cleaning up after execution.
Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
-CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
( Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe ) Processes.process IN ("*call *", "*timeout *") NOT Processes.user IN ("SYSTEM", "*\\SYSTEM")
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Legitimate batch scripts and installers may use call with variable assignment, or may
delete themselves after a delay using timeout and del. Filter by parent process, user or
script path as needed.
References: -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/ -https://www.huntress.com/blog/clickfix-castleloader-backgroundfix -https://www.esentire.com/blog/amatera-stealer-4-0-2-beta-whats-new-in-this-variant drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns', 'Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information']