Name:Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences id:155020ba-3fd8-4109-a83d-091aeb966dba version:1 date:None author:Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes.
This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.
Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
-CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
( Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe ) NOT Processes.process = "*nmap*" NOT Processes.process = "* tsx *"
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.
References: -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/ -https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns', 'Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information']