Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification

Name:Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification
id:5682052e-ce55-4f9f-8d28-59191420b7e0
version:8
date:2026-03-10
author:Dean Luxton
status:production
type:TTP
Description:This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes: "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink", "scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram". Modifications to these attributes can indicate potential malicious activity or privilege escalation attempts. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
Data_source:

• -Windows Event Log Security 5136

search:`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName IN ("msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo","msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity","scriptPath","msTSInitialProgram") OperationType=%%14674 ```Changes to the attribute "msDS-KeyCredentialLink" are also worth moniroting, however tuning will need to be applied```

| table _time ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName AttributeValue AttributeLDAPDisplayName

| rename SubjectLogonId as TargetLogonId, src_user as initiator, _time as eventTime

| appendpipe [

| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"]

| stats min(eventTime) as _time values(initiator) as src_user, values(DSName) as targetDomain, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN, values(ObjectClass) as ObjectClass, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(LogonType) as LogonType values(AttributeValue) as AttributeValue values(AttributeLDAPDisplayName) as AttributeLDAPDisplayName
BY TargetLogonId

| rex field=ObjectDN "^CN=(?P<cn>.*?),[A-Z]{2}\="

| eval dest=if(ObjectClass="computer",cn,null), user=if(ObjectClass="user",cn,null)

| fields - cn

| `windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification_filter`

how_to_implement:Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes.
known_false_positives:If key credentials are regularly assigned to users, these events will need to be tuned out.
References:
  -https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
  -https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
drilldown_searches:
 name:'View the detection results for - "$src_user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search src_user = "$src_user$" dest = "$dest$"'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src_user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src_user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1222.001'
    - 'T1550'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/dacl_abuse/suspicious_acl_modification-windows-security-xml.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
manual_test:None