Verclsid CLSID Execution

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Verclsid CLSID Execution
id:61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122
version:3
date:2024-10-17
author:Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic detects the potential abuse of the verclsid.exe utility to execute malicious files via generated CLSIDs. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with verclsid.exe. This activity is significant because verclsid.exe is a legitimate Windows application used to verify CLSID COM objects, and its misuse can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise or further malicious activities.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process="*/S*" Processes.process="*/C*" AND Processes.process="*{*" AND Processes.process="*}*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.
References:
  -https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5
  -https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/
drilldown_searches:
  :
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Unusual Processes'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  confidence:50
  impact:50
  message:process $process_name$ to execute possible clsid commandline $process$ in $dest$
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1218.012'
    - 'T1218'
  observable:
    name:'dest'
    type:'Hostname'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'Processes.dest'
    - 'Processes.user'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_name'
    - 'Processes.parent_process'
    - 'Processes.original_file_name'
    - 'Processes.process_name'
    - 'Processes.process'
    - 'Processes.process_id'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_path'
    - 'Processes.process_path'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_id'
  risk_score:25
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.012/verclsid_exec/sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
manual_test:None

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