Suspicious MSBuild Rename

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Suspicious MSBuild Rename
id:4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version:6
date:2024-10-17
author:Michael Haag, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic detects the execution of renamed instances of msbuild.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
References:
  -https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
  -https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
  -https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
drilldown_searches:
  :
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild'
    - 'Masquerading - Rename System Utilities'
    - 'Living Off The Land'
    - 'Cobalt Strike'
    - 'BlackByte Ransomware'
    - 'Graceful Wipe Out Attack'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  confidence:90
  impact:70
  message:Suspicious renamed msbuild.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1036'
    - 'T1127'
    - 'T1036.003'
    - 'T1127.001'
  observable:
    name:'dest'
    type:'Endpoint'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'Processes.dest'
    - 'Processes.user'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_name'
    - 'Processes.parent_process'
    - 'Processes.original_file_name'
    - 'Processes.process_name'
    - 'Processes.process'
    - 'Processes.process_id'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_path'
    - 'Processes.process_path'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_id'
  risk_score:63
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
  update_timestamp: True
manual_test:None