PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset
id:2fcbce12-cffa-4c84-b70c-192604d201d0
version:3
date:2024-09-30
author:Steven Dick
status:production
type:TTP
Description:The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes (EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
Data_source:
  • -PingID
search:`pingid` "result.message" = "*Device Paired*"
| rex field=result.message "Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?<device_extract>.+)"
| eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message'
| eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract)
| eval action=CASE(match('result.message',"Device Paired*"),"created",match('result.message', "Device Unpaired*"),"deleted")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(reason) as reason by src,user,action,object
| join type=outer user [| search `wineventlog_security` EventID IN(4723,4724)
| eval PW_Change_Time = _time, user = upper(user)
| fields user,src_user,EventID,PW_Change_Time]
| eval timeDiffRaw = round(lastTime - PW_Change_Time)
| eval timeDiff = replace(tostring(abs(timeDiffRaw) ,"duration"),"(\d*)\+*(\d+):(\d+):(\d+)","\2 hours \3 minutes")
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(PW_Change_Time)`
| where timeDiffRaw > 0 AND timeDiffRaw < 3600
| `pingid_new_mfa_method_after_credential_reset_filter`


how_to_implement:Target environment must ingest Windows Event Log and PingID(PingOne) data sources. Specifically from logs from Active Directory Domain Controllers and JSON logging from a PingID(PingOne) enterprise environment, either via Webhook or Push Subscription.
known_false_positives:False positives may be generated by normal provisioning workflows that generate a password reset followed by a device registration.
References:
  -https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-azure-ad-blog/defend-your-users-from-mfa-fatigue-attacks/ba-p/2365677
  -https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mfa-fatigue-hackers-new-favorite-tactic-in-high-profile-breaches/
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
  -https://docs.pingidentity.com/r/en-us/pingoneforenterprise/p14e_subscriptions?tocId=3xhnxjX3VzKNs3SXigWnQA
drilldown_searches:
name:'View the detection results for - "$user$"'
search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"'
search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Compromised User Account'
  asset_type:Identity
  confidence:50
  impact:100
  message:An MFA configuration change was detected for [$user$] within [$timeDiff$] of a password reset. The device [$object$] was $action$.
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1621'
    - 'T1556.006'
    - 'T1098.005'
  observable:
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'object'
    type:'Other'
    - role:
      - 'Attacker'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'user'
    - 'src_user'
    - 'src'
    - 'EventID'
    - 'resources{}.ipaddress'
    - 'actors{}.name'
    - 'result.message'
    - 'resources{}.devicemodel'
  risk_score:50
  security_domain:access

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1621/pingid/windows_pw_reset.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1621/pingid/pingid.log
  source: PINGID
  sourcetype: _json
manual_test:None

Related Analytic Stories


Compromised User Account