Net Localgroup Discovery

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Net Localgroup Discovery
id:54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122
version:4
date:2024-11-26
author:Michael Haag, Splunk
status:production
type:Hunting
Description:The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup` command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships, potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 1
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4688
  • -CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process="*localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`


how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives:False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
References:
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
  -https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
  -https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
  -https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
  :
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Prestige Ransomware'
    - 'Volt Typhoon'
    - 'Graceful Wipe Out Attack'
    - 'IcedID'
    - 'Windows Discovery Techniques'
    - 'Windows Post-Exploitation'
    - 'Azorult'
    - 'Active Directory Discovery'
    - 'Rhysida Ransomware'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  confidence:50
  impact:30
  message:Local group discovery on $dest$ by $user$.
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1069'
    - 'T1069.001'
  observable:
    name:'dest'
    type:'Endpoint'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'Processes.dest'
    - 'Processes.user'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_name'
    - 'Processes.parent_process'
    - 'Processes.original_file_name'
    - 'Processes.process_name'
    - 'Processes.process'
    - 'Processes.process_id'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_path'
    - 'Processes.process_path'
    - 'Processes.parent_process_id'
  risk_score:15
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1069.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
manual_test:None