Name:Linux Auditd Web or Application Server Spawning a Shell id:59a644b2-51eb-4995-9fc5-b0ff08926d73 version:1 date:None author:Raven Tait, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects instances where Java, web server, or application server processes attempts to spawn
a Linux shell, which may indicate exploitation attempts. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response
(EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and parent-child process relationships. This activity may indicate a
compromised service leading to unauthorized shell access. If confirmed malicious, attackers could execute commands,
escalate privileges, or maintain persistent access.
Data_source:
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime last(_time) as lastTime values(web_process_name) as parent_process_name values(web_process) as parent_process values(shell_pid) as pid values(shell_process_name) as process_name values(shell_process) as process by host parent_pid
| rename host as dest
| where isnotnull(parent_process) AND isnotnull(process) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_auditd_web_or_application_server_spawning_a_shell_filter`
how_to_implement:To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd data, that consists of SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and
PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should
be ingested and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), which is
essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step involves normalizing the field names to match
the field names set by the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources
and enhance the efficiency of data modeling. This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of Linux endpoints
where auditd is deployed. Importantly, auditd must also be configured with syscall rules that target the web server
executable (for example, `-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F exe=/usr/sbin/apache2 -S execve -S execveat -k apache_syscall`,
repeated for arch=b32). Web server workers typically run as a service account with auid=unset, so human-session rules
in a base ruleset do not cover them, and without such rules the web server's syscalls will not be captured and this
detection will not fire. Adjust the exe path for your web server (e.g., nginx, httpd, or java). known_false_positives:Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic
based on asset type. References: -https://www.php2shell.com/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/ -https://hunt.io/blog/php2shell-honeypot-shells-root-palo-alto-firewalls -https://github.com/0x4D31/honeypot-data/blob/main/reports/php2shell/2026-10-24-confirmed-rce.md drilldown_searches:
: analytic_story:['PHP2Shell']