Name:Linux Auditd SOCK RAW EAFNOSUPPORT From User Writable Path id:7c1c36e6-014d-4a2c-b3ab-84d7cec3bbc2 version:1 date:None author:Raven Tait, Splunk status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects a process executing from a user-writable directory calling socket() with SOCK_RAW (a1=3) and receiving EAFNOSUPPORT (exit=-97, errno 97).
This is the kernel trigger for vhost-vsock class privilege escalation exploits.
When socket() is called with an unregistered address family and SOCK_RAW, the kernel calls request_module() to attempt to load a matching protocol module.
In vulnerable kernels, this triggers a stale IOTLB metadata cache access path that allows an unprivileged user to write an arbitrary value to modprobe_path.
The specific address family number varies by kernel and exploit variant (AF 41, 42, or any unregistered AF). Data_source:
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(exe) as process_path values(a0) as address_family values(pid) as pid values(ppid) as ppid
how_to_implement:This detection requires auditd rules to capture failed socket() calls. Add the following rule to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit.rules to capture SOCK_RAW failures:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a1=3 -F success=0 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k sock_raw_eafnosupport
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S socket -F a1=3 -F success=0 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -k sock_raw_eafnosupport
These logs should be ingested and processed using the Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833). known_false_positives:Legitimate processes almost never open a SOCK_RAW socket with an unregistered address family. The EAFNOSUPPORT error on a raw socket from a non-system path has no benign use case outside of socket fuzzing or explicit error-handling tests References: -https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-74580 -https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/ drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$auid$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" auid = "$auid$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Linux Privilege Escalation', 'Compromised Linux Host']