Name:Linux Auditd Shell Execution by Non-User Account id:543a973e-83cf-4d37-9562-9e16c99d3969 version:1 date:None author:Raven Tait, Splunk status:production type:Anomaly Description:The following analytic detects successful auditd execve events that launch an interactive Linux shell, identified by a TTY, under accounts that commonly do not log in.
These are identified by a list of well-known service account names or by a system UID (between 1 and 999).
An interactive shell for these accounts may indicate password-bypass abuse or unauthorized access. Data_source:
-Linux Auditd Syscall
search:`linux_auditd` type=SYSCALL comm IN ( "ash", "bash", "csh", "dash", "fish", "ksh", "mksh", "rbash", "sh", "tcsh", "yash", "zsh" ) success=yes
| where isnotnull(tty) AND tty!="(none)"
| rex field=_raw "\\bUID=[[:punct:]]?(?<audit_user>[[:alnum:]_.-]+)"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(audit_user) as user values(uid) as uid values(euid) as euid values(comm) as shell values(exe) as executable values(tty) as tty by dest
how_to_implement:To implement this detection, you should ingest auditd data, that consists of SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems.
These logs should be ingested and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data.
The next step involves normalizing the field names to match the field names set by the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources and enhance the efficiency of data modeling.
This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of Linux endpoints where auditd is deployed. known_false_positives:System administrators and automation may run shells under service accounts or accounts that are not locked on a particular image.
The search also matches any account with a UID between 1 and 999 (the system account range on most modern distributions), so administrators who use su or sudo to open an interactive shell as a service account such as jenkins or gitlab-runner will trigger it.
On legacy systems (for example RHEL/CentOS 6) regular users may start at UID 500, so adjust the threshold if needed.
Review the account's shadow state and the process context before escalating. References: -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/ -https://sshhole.com drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Linux Privilege Escalation', 'SSHHole']