Name:HTTP Base64 Activity With JVM Errors id:26f87d5e-671f-402c-9cb7-7e57816ef22e version:1 date:None author:Nasreddine Bencherchali, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk status:production type:Anomaly Description:The analytic associates each Zeek request containing a malformed Base64 value or a scripted decoder trigger with a nearby Base64-related HotSpot argument exception on the same server and Java PID.
Sysmon child process, file creation, or process termination events from that PID add context and can raise confidence.
Data_source:
-Zeek HTTP
-Zeek HTTP Request Headers
-Zeek HTTP POST Body
-Java HotSpot Exceptions
-Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
-Sysmon for Linux EventID 5
-Sysmon for Linux EventID 11
search:( `zeek_http_request_headers` header_name IN ( "AUTHORIZATION", "HTTP2-SETTINGS", "CONTENT-TYPE", "CONTENT-DISPOSITION", "PRIORITY", "X-CONSOLEANNOTATOR", "X-CONNECT-AUTHORIZATION", "X-CSRF-TOKEN" ) header_value="*=*" truncated=false ) OR ( `zeek_http_post_body` body="*=*" truncated=false ) OR ( `zeek_http_uri` uri IN ("*=*","*%3D*","*%3d*") ) OR ( `java_hotspot_exceptions` ( "*Input byte array has wrong*" OR "*IllegalArgumentException*" OR "*Base64$Decoder*" OR "*java/util/Base64*" ) ) OR ( `sysmon_linux` ( (EventID=1 ParentImage="*/java") OR (EventID=5 Image="*/java") OR ( EventID=11 Image="*/java" NOT TargetFilename IN ("*/_state/*","*/indices/*") ) ) )
| rex field=_raw "^\[(?<jvm_event_time_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_pid_raw>\d+)\]\[(?<jvm_level_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_tags_raw>[^\]]+)\]\s*(?<jvm_message_raw>.*)"
| eval malformed_b64=if( is_network=1 AND match(request_value,"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_-])(?:(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]?==)|(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9_-]?==))(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"), 1,0 ), scripted_b64=if( is_network=1 AND isnotnull(body) AND like(body,"%Base64.getDecoder()%") AND like(body,"%new byte[65]%") AND like(body,"%[64] = (byte)61%"), 1,0 )
| eval event_kind=case( is_network=1 AND (malformed_b64=1 OR scripted_b64=1),"request", isnotnull(jvm_pid) AND like(jvm_tags,"%exceptions%"),"jvm", EventID=1 OR EventID=5 OR EventID=11,"sysmon" )
| where isnotnull(event_kind) AND isnotnull(observed_target) AND isnotnull(java_pid) AND isnotnull(request_uid)
| eval argument_error=if(event_kind="jvm" AND match(jvm_message,"(?i)IllegalArgumentException|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0), decoder_evidence=if(event_kind="jvm" AND match(jvm_message,"Base64[$]Decoder|java/util/Base64|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0), shell_child=if(EventID=1 AND match(Image,"/(ash|bash|csh|dash|eshell|fish|ion|ksh|mksh|rbash|sh|tcsh|zsh)$"),1,0), child_process=if(EventID=1,1,0), file_created=if(EventID=11,1,0), java_terminated=if(EventID=5,1,0), suspicious_file=if(EventID=11 AND match(TargetFilename,"(?i)(?:[.](?:jsp|sh|so)$|/(?:tmp|var/tmp|dev/shm|webapps)/)"),1,0)
| eval request_marker=case( event_kind="request" AND scripted_b64=1,"scripted_decoder_trigger", event_kind="request" AND malformed_b64=1,"malformed_base64_request" ), src_ip=if(event_kind="request",'id.orig_h',null()), request_uri=if(event_kind="request",uri,null()), http_method=if(event_kind="request",method,null()), child_image=if(EventID=1,Image,null()), created_file=if(EventID=11,TargetFilename,null())
| bin _time span=1s
| stats min(event_time) AS first_seen max(event_time) AS last_seen max(argument_error) AS argument_error max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence max(shell_child) AS shell_child max(child_process) AS child_process max(file_created) AS file_created max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file values(src_ip) AS src_ips values(request_uri) AS uris values(http_method) AS methods values(carrier) AS carriers values(request_marker) AS request_markers values(child_image) AS child_images values(created_file) AS created_files BY _time observed_target java_pid request_uid event_kind
| where (event_kind="jvm" AND last_seen>=request_time-3 AND first_seen<=request_time+15) OR (event_kind="sysmon" AND last_seen>=request_time-3 AND first_seen<=request_time+30)
| stats min(request_time) AS request_time min(eval(if(argument_error=1,first_seen,null()))) AS exception_time max(last_seen) AS last_seen max(argument_error) AS argument_error max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence max(shell_child) AS shell_child max(child_process) AS child_process max(file_created) AS file_created max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file values(src) AS src values(request_dest) AS dest_ips values(uri) AS uri values(method) AS method values(carrier) AS carrier values(request_marker) AS request_markers values(child_images) AS child_images values(created_files) AS created_files BY target request_uid java_pid
| where argument_error=1 AND decoder_evidence=1
| eval dest=mvindex(dest_ips,0), exception_delay=round(exception_time-request_time,3), confidence=case( shell_child>0 OR suspicious_file>0,"high", child_process>0 OR file_created>0 OR java_terminated>0,"medium", true(),"low" ), asset_id=target, firstTime=request_time, lastTime=last_seen
how_to_implement:Configure zeek_http_uri, zeek_http_request_headers, zeek_http_post_body, and java_hotspot_exceptions for the indexes and sourcetypes in your environment. Configure sysmon_linux if you collect that optional source.
Install the TA for Zeek for standard HTTP logs. To collect the optional header and POST-body streams, install the custom scripts from https://gist.github.com/nasbench/8581572459af92b7c30599f1068c791f (request headers) and https://gist.github.com/nasbench/4cd18a938056cbfbc8a9832edb26f4c4 (POST bodies), following the corresponding data source instructions. These scripts are not included with ESCU or the TA for Zeek. Ensure uid, uri, id.orig_h, id.resp_h, header_name, header_value, body, and truncated are extracted as applicable. The sensor must see request plaintext.
HotSpot exception diagnostics are not written to a standard file by default. Tomcat normally writes JULI logs under CATALINA_BASE/logs (and, on Unix with its startup scripts, console output to catalina.out); Spring Boot writes application logs to the console by default; and Elasticsearch application logs use /var/log/elasticsearch for Debian/RPM packages, ES_HOME/logs for tar/zip installs, or container stdout. Elasticsearch enables GC logs by default, but these are separate from the exception stream required here.
Add this JVM startup option with a writable path chosen for the deployment:
-Xlog:exceptions=debug:file=/var/log/myapp/exceptions-%p.log:utctime,pid,level,tags:filecount=8,filesize=16m
For Tomcat scripts, place it in CATALINA_OPTS via CATALINA_BASE/bin/setenv.sh or setenv.bat; for a Windows Tomcat service, configure its Java options. For Spring Boot, add it to the Java service or container launch command. For Elasticsearch, add a .options file in config/jvm.options.d or /etc/elasticsearch/jvm.options.d, according to the installation method, and preserve existing JVM logging settings. Spring Boot logging.file.name and Tomcat logging.properties control application or container logs, not HotSpot unified logging.
Forward the configured file and rotations as java:hotspot:exceptions. On the Splunk parsing tier, configure single-line event breaking and timestamps for utctime. Search-time extraction in props.conf is optional: use EXTRACT-jvm_unified (or a shared REPORT transform) for reusable jvm_pid, jvm_tags, and jvm_message fields, or leave those fields unconfigured and let this search parse the decorated _raw line with `rex`. The search coalesces raw and pre-extracted values, including jvm_tags, before correlating the Java PID. The Java HotSpot Exceptions data source gives the input and optional extraction pattern. Verify the raw format, host identity, file permissions, and retention before enabling the search. Exception logging can be high volume, and an exception event is not guaranteed during exploitation.
Optionally ingest Sysmon for Linux EventID 1, 5, and 11 with ParentImage, ParentProcessId, Image, ProcessId, and TargetFilename. Process creation joins on ParentProcessId; file creation and process termination join on ProcessId.
Configure Enterprise Security Assets and Identities so the Zeek destination IP and the JVM or Sysmon hostname resolve to the same dest_asset_id through `get_asset(dest)`. Synchronize the sensor and server clocks. The search permits JVM events from 3 seconds before to 15 seconds after each request marker, and optional Sysmon events up to 30 seconds after it. Tune these windows to measured collection delays.
known_false_positives:One JVM can handle concurrent requests, so an exception may fall within 15 seconds of more than one malformed request. HotSpot logs do not carry the Zeek uid, and this search establishes time proximity rather than causation.
Ordinary Java child processes and file writes can coincide with the request. Review the URI, Zeek uid, exception delay, Java PID, child image, and created path.
Clock skew, PID reuse, and incorrect host/IP mapping can misassociate events. Sysmon evidence is supporting context and is not required for a result.
References: -https://calif.io/java4shell/ -https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-11-17 drilldown_searches:
: analytic_story:['Java4Shell - CVE-2026-114938']