Name:Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell id:584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122 version:3 date:2024-09-30 author:Michael Haag, Splunk status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command via PowerShell, commonly used by adversaries to gather domain trust information. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts to map out domain trusts, which can inform further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand domain relationships, aiding in lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network. Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
-CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. known_false_positives:Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute. References: -https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Get-ForestTrust/ drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' tags: analytic_story: - 'Active Directory Discovery' asset_type:Endpoint confidence:40 impact:30 message:Suspicious PowerShell Get-ForestTrust was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. mitre_attack_id: - 'T1482' observable: name:'user' type:'User' - role: - 'Victim' name:'dest' type:'Hostname' - role: - 'Victim' product: - 'Splunk Enterprise' - 'Splunk Enterprise Security' - 'Splunk Cloud' required_fields: - '_time' - 'Processes.dest' - 'Processes.user' - 'Processes.parent_process_name' - 'Processes.parent_process' - 'Processes.original_file_name' - 'Processes.process_name' - 'Processes.process' - 'Processes.process_id' - 'Processes.parent_process_path' - 'Processes.process_path' - 'Processes.parent_process_id' risk_score:12 security_domain:endpoint
