Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection
id:e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a
version:7
date:2024-09-30
author:Michael Haag, Splunk
status:production
type:TTP
Description:The following analytic identifies instances of Regsvcs.exe establishing a network connection to a public IP address, excluding private IP ranges. This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 3 logs to monitor network connections initiated by Regsvcs.exe. This activity is significant as Regsvcs.exe, a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary, can be exploited to bypass application control mechanisms and establish remote Command and Control (C2) channels. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, and exfiltrate sensitive data. Immediate investigation and remediation are recommended.
Data_source:
  • -Sysmon EventID 3
search:`sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`


how_to_implement:To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives:Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
References:
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
  -https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
  -https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
drilldown_searches:
name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity'
    - 'Living Off The Land'
  asset_type:Endpoint
  confidence:100
  impact:80
  message:An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1218'
    - 'T1218.009'
  observable:
    name:'user'
    type:'User'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'dest'
    type:'Hostname'
    - role:
      - 'Victim'
    name:'process_name'
    type:'Process'
    - role:
      - 'Attacker'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  required_fields:
    - '_time'
    - 'EventID'
    - 'dest_ip'
    - 'process_name'
    - 'dest'
    - 'user'
    - 'src_ip'
    - 'dest_host'
  risk_score:80
  security_domain:endpoint

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
manual_test:None