Name:Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created id:f820b423-7299-4bb6-9bf3-860bd475cddb version:1 date:None author:descambiado status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user.
It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" operation.
TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who
creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor.
If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.
Data_source:
-Azure Active Directory
search:`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" properties.result="success"
| rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp
| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)
| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser | rename userAgent as user_agent
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime BY dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetUser signature
how_to_implement:You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase
(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory
events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with
the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives:IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless
authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating
a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside
business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.
References: -https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass -https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/ -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/ drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$targetUser$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search targetUser = "$targetUser$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Azure Active Directory Persistence', 'Azure Active Directory Account Takeover']