Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Azure AD Temporary Access Pass Created
id:f820b423-7299-4bb6-9bf3-860bd475cddb
version:1
date:None
author:descambiado
status:production
type:TTP
Description:The following analytic detects the creation of a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Create Temporary Access Pass method for user" operation. TAPs are time-limited passcodes that bypass all authentication requirements including MFA and FIDO2 - an attacker who creates a TAP for a compromised account can sign in from any location without any additional factor. If confirmed malicious, this activity provides an attacker with an unchallenged authentication path into the affected account.
Data_source:
  • -Azure Active Directory
search:`azure_monitor_aad`
category=AuditLogs
operationName="Create Temporary Access Pass method for user"
properties.result="success"

| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser
| rename userAgent as user_agent

| fillnull

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest user src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
actor targetUser signature

| rename actor as user

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_temporary_access_pass_created_filter`


how_to_implement:You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives:IT administrators legitimately create TAPs for users who are locked out or onboarding a new passwordless authentication method. The key differentiators are the actor and timing -- a helpdesk account creating a TAP for a user who just reported a lockout is expected; an unfamiliar actor creating a TAP outside business hours or for a high-privilege account warrants investigation.
References:
  -https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass
  -https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
drilldown_searches:
 name:'View the detection results for - "$targetUser$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search targetUser = "$targetUser$"'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 earliest_offset:'7d'
 latest_offset:'0'
analytic_story:['Azure Active Directory Persistence', 'Azure Active Directory Account Takeover']

asset_type:Azure Active Directory

mitre_attack_id:['T1556.006', 'T1078.004', 'T1586.003']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:cloud

security_domain:identity

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1556.006/azure_ad_temporary_access_pass/azure-audit.log
  source: Azure AD
  sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None