Name:Azure AD Federated Identity Credential Added To Service Principal id:bfa745d4-4e43-4ff1-ad15-2f663fdf5cbf version:2 date:None author:descambiado, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk status:production type:TTP Description:The following analytic detects additions of federated identity credentials to Entra ID service principals.
It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update service principal" or "Update application" operations and filters on the FederatedIdentityCredentials modifiedProperty.
Workload identity federation allows external OIDC workloads such as GitHub Actions or Kubernetes to authenticate as the SP without a secret.
If an attacker adds a federated credential pointing to a controlled OIDC issuer, they gain a persistent secretless authentication path into the SP that survives credential rotations and is not visible in standard secrets monitoring.
Data_source:
-Azure Active Directory
search:`azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName IN ("Update application", "Update service principal") properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName="FederatedIdentityCredentials"
| rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp
| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)
| rename targetResources{}.displayName as targetSpName | rename userAgent as user_agent
| where mvcount(newCredNames) > coalesce(mvcount(oldCredNames), 0)
| fillnull value="unknown" dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetSpName newCreds oldCreds signature
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime BY dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetSpName newCreds oldCreds signature
how_to_implement:You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details).
You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub.
This analytic was written to be used with the "azure:monitor:aad sourcetype" leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives:Platform engineers legitimately configure federated credentials when setting up GitHub Actions OIDC federation, Kubernetes Workload Identity, or other secretless CI/CD patterns.
Validate the actor, the target SP, and whether the issuer in newCreds corresponds to a known trusted OIDC provider.
Unknown issuers or overly permissive subject claims in the newCreds JSON warrant immediate investigation.
References: -https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/workload-id/workload-identity-federation -https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/workload-id/workload-identity-federation-create-trust -https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-hardening-your-deployments/about-security-hardening-with-openid-connect -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/ drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$targetSpName$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search targetSpName = "$targetSpName$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['Azure Active Directory Persistence', 'NOBELIUM Group']