AWS Bedrock Delete Model Invocation Logging Configuration

Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:AWS Bedrock Delete Model Invocation Logging Configuration
id:9c5e3d62-f743-11ee-9f6e-acde48001124
version:1
date:2024-12-05
author:Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status:production
type:TTP
Description:The following analytic identifies attempts to delete AWS Bedrock model invocation logging configurations. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect when a user or service calls the DeleteModelInvocationLogging API. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to remove audit trails of model interactions after compromising credentials. Deleting model invocation logs could allow attackers to interact with AI models without leaving traces, potentially enabling them to conduct data exfiltration, prompt injection attacks, or other malicious activities without detection. If confirmed malicious, this could represent a deliberate attempt to hide unauthorized model usage and evade detection.
Data_source:
  • -AWS CloudTrail DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration
search:`cloudtrail` eventSource=bedrock.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration
| rename user_name as user
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src user user_agent vendor_account vendor_product dest signature vendor_region
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `aws_bedrock_delete_model_invocation_logging_configuration_filter`


how_to_implement:The Splunk AWS Add-on is required to utilize this data. The search requires AWS CloudTrail logs with Bedrock service events enabled. You must install and configure the AWS App for Splunk (version 6.0.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) to collect CloudTrail logs from AWS. Ensure the CloudTrail is capturing Bedrock model invocation logging management events.
known_false_positives:Legitimate administrators may delete model invocation logging configurations during maintenance, when updating logging policies, or when cleaning up unused resources. Consider implementing an allowlist for expected administrators who regularly manage logging configurations.
References:
  -https://www.sumologic.com/blog/defenders-guide-to-aws-bedrock/
  -https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/
drilldown_searches:
name:'View the detection results for - "$user$"'
search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"'
search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
tags:
  analytic_story:
    - 'AWS Bedrock Security'
  asset_type:AWS Account
  mitre_attack_id:
    - 'T1562.008'
  product:
    - 'Splunk Enterprise'
    - 'Splunk Enterprise Security'
    - 'Splunk Cloud'
  security_domain:threat

tests:
name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.008/aws_bedrock_delete_model_invocation_logging/cloudtrail.json
  sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
  source: aws_cloudtrail
manual_test:None

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AWS Bedrock Security