Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process: endpointEndpointNoneversion:18
This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that uses several application tools that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script may execute suspicious code.
Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App: endpointEndpointNoneversion:15
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe utility.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry.
It excludes scripts launched from common trusted directories, including nested subdirectories under Program Files, Windows System32, and Windows SysWOW64.
Windows Non Browser Process Access Browser Cache Dir: endpointEndpointNoneversion:1
This analytic detects non-browser processes accessing files in local browser cache directories using Windows Security EventCode 4663.
A script or utility reading Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache entries may be extracting web-delivered content for staging or execution.
Windows Rundll32 Load DLL in Temp Dir: endpointEndpointNoneversion:7
This detection identifies instances where rundll32.exe is used to load a DLL from a temporary directory, such as C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Local\Temp\ or C:\Windows\Temp\. While rundll32.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used to execute functions exported from DLLs, its use to load libraries from temporary locations is highly suspicious. These directories are commonly used by malware and red team tools to stage payloads or execute code in-memory without writing it to more persistent locations. This behavior often indicates defense evasion, initial access, or privilege escalation, especially when the DLL is unsigned, recently written, or executed shortly after download. In normal user workflows, DLLs are not typically loaded from Temp paths, making this a high-fidelity indicator of potentially malicious activity. Monitoring this pattern is essential for detecting threats that attempt to blend in with native system processes while bypassing traditional application controls.
Windows Content Copied from Browser was Executed: endpointEndpointNoneversion:2
The following analytic correlates modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key with clipboard content
changes initiated by browsers. It aims to detect ClickFix scenarios in which commands copied
from a browser are subsequently executed on the Windows system through the Run dialog box.
Windows PowerShell Script Block Browser Cache Access: endpointEndpointNoneversion:1
This analytic detects PowerShell Script Block Logging events that enumerate or read browser cache directories.
PowerShell inspecting Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache files can indicate cache smuggling, where web content disguised as an image is extracted and staged for execution.
The analytic looks for browser cache paths together with file enumeration or read operations, rather than relying on cache markers or a specific payload name.
Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir: endpointEndpointNoneversion:22
The following analytic detects a non-Chrome process accessing files in the Chrome user default folder. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify unauthorized access attempts. This activity is significant because the Chrome default folder contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information, often associated with RATs, trojans, and advanced persistent threats like FIN7. Such access could lead to data theft and further compromise of the affected system.
Windows RunMRU Command Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which stores a history of commands executed through the Run dialog box (Windows+R). It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to monitor registry events targeting this key. This activity is significant as malware often uses the Run dialog to execute malicious commands while attempting to appear legitimate. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an attacker using indirect command execution techniques for defense evasion or persistence. The detection excludes MRUList value changes to focus on actual command entries.
Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters: endpointEndpointNoneversion:17
The following detects the execution of cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes spawned by cmd.exe, leveraging Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, with additional contextual filtering to improve fidelity and reduce false positives.
It focuses on executions originating from user-writable directories such as Users, AppData, Temp, and Downloads, which are commonly abused by attackers to stage and execute malicious scripts, while excluding trusted system paths like C:\Windows\System32\ and C:\Program Files\ that are typically associated with legitimate activity.
The detection also filters out service accounts (e.g., accounts ending with $ or known naming conventions) to minimize noise from automated processes and incorporates command-line context to better assess script execution patterns and identify potentially suspicious behavior.
Windows DLL Module Loaded in Temp Dir: endpointEndpointNoneversion:6
The following analytic detects instances where a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) is loaded from a temporary directory on a Windows system. Loading DLLs from non-standard paths such as %TEMP% is uncommon for legitimate applications and is often associated with adversary tradecraft, including DLL search order hijacking, side-loading, or execution of malicious payloads staged in temporary folders. Adversaries frequently leverage these directories because they are writable by standard users and often overlooked by security controls, making them convenient locations to drop and execute malicious files. This behavior may indicate attempts to evade detection, execute unauthorized code, or maintain persistence through hijacked execution flows. Detection of DLL loads from %TEMP% can help surface early signs of compromise and should be investigated in the context of the originating process, user account, and potential file creation or modification activity within the same directory.
Windows PowerShell FakeCAPTCHA Clipboard Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:10
This detection identifies potential FakeCAPTCHA/ClickFix clipboard hijacking campaigns by looking for PowerShell execution with hidden window parameters and distinctive strings related to fake CAPTCHA verification. These campaigns use social engineering to trick users into pasting malicious PowerShell commands from their clipboard, typically delivering information stealers or remote access trojans.
Windows Rundll32 with Non-Standard File Extension: endpointEndpointNoneversion:4
This analytic identifies the instance of rundll32.exe process loading a non-standard Windows modules file extension.
This behavior is not common and can be associated with malicious activities, such as the Gh0st RAT backdoor. This technique is to evade possible detection by security tools that monitors a suspicious dll loading activity.