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About
WMI Persistence
Original Source:
[Sigma source]
Title:
WMI Persistence
Status:
test
Description:
Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
References:
-https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397
-https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
Author:
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community
Date:
2017-08-22
modified:
2022-02-10
Tags:
-'attack.persistence'
-'attack.privilege-escalation'
-'attack.t1546.003'
Logsource:
product: windows
service: wmi
definition: WMI Namespaces Auditing and SACL should be configured, EventID 5861 and 5859 detection requires Windows 10, 2012 and higher
Detection:
wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding:
EventID
:
'5861'
consumer_keywords:
- 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineTemplate'
wmi_filter_registration:
EventID
:
'5859'
filter_scmevent:
Provider
:
'SCM Event Provider'
Query
:
'select * from MSFT_SCMEventLogEvent'
User
:
'S-1-5-32-544'
PossibleCause
:
'Permanent'
condition
:
( (wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding and consumer_keywords) or (wmi_filter_registration) ) and not filter_scmevent
Falsepositives:
-Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)
Level:
medium