Hybrid Identity

T1556.007

Sub-technique of T1556 Modify Authentication Process.View on attack.mitre.org

About this technique

Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.

Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID:

* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud
* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory
* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID

AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges.

By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials. In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.

In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.

Detection rules0

Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1556.007.

Sigma0

No Sigma rules are mapped to this technique yet.

Splunk0

No Splunk rules are mapped to this technique yet.

Groups1

Software1

Campaigns0

None recorded.

Procedure examples2

Groups1

Used byProcedure example
GroupAPT29

APT29 has edited the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost.exe.config` file to load a malicious DLL into the AD FS process, thereby enabling persistent access to any service federated with AD FS for a user with a specified User Principal Name.

Software1

Used byProcedure example
ToolAADInternals

AADInternals can inject a malicious DLL (`PTASpy`) into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` to backdoor Azure AD Pass-Through Authentication.

References5

  1. AADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud Open source
    Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, July 13). Unnoticed sidekick: Getting access to cloud as an on-prem admin. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  2. Azure AD Connect for Read Teamers Open source
    Adam Chester. (2019, February 18). Azure AD Connect for Red Teamers. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  3. Azure AD Hybrid Identity Open source
    Microsoft. (2022, August 26). Choose the right authentication method for your Azure Active Directory hybrid identity solution. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  4. MagicWeb Open source
    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24). MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  5. Mandiant Azure AD Backdoors Open source
    Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.