vSphere Installation Bundles

T1505.006

Sub-technique of T1505 Server Software Component.View on attack.mitre.org

About this technique

Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors. VIBs are collections of files used for software distribution and virtual system management in VMware environments. Since ESXi uses an in-memory filesystem where changes made to most files are stored in RAM rather than in persistent storage, these modifications are lost after a reboot. However, VIBs can be used to create startup tasks, apply custom firewall rules, or deploy binaries that persist across reboots. Typically, administrators use VIBs for updates and system maintenance.

VIBs can be broken down into three components:

* VIB payload: a `.vgz` archive containing the directories and files to be created and executed on boot when the VIBs are loaded.
* Signature file: verifies the host acceptance level of a VIB, indicating what testing and validation has been done by VMware or its partners before publication of a VIB. By default, ESXi hosts require a minimum acceptance level of PartnerSupported for VIB installation, meaning the VIB is published by a trusted VMware partner. However, privileged users can change the default acceptance level using the `esxcli` command line interface. Additionally, VIBs are able to be installed regardless of acceptance level by using the esxcli software vib install --force command.
* XML descriptor file: a configuration file containing associated VIB metadata, such as the name of the VIB and its dependencies.

Adversaries may leverage malicious VIB packages to maintain persistent access to ESXi hypervisors, allowing system changes to be executed upon each bootup of ESXi – such as using `esxcli` to enable firewall rules for backdoor traffic, creating listeners on hard coded ports, and executing backdoors. Adversaries may also masquerade their malicious VIB files as PartnerSupported by modifying the XML descriptor file.

Detection rules1

Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1505.006.

Sigma0

No Sigma rules are mapped to this technique yet.

Splunk1

RuleTypeRiskData source
ESXi Malicious VIB Forced InstallTTPNULLVMWare ESXi Syslog

Groups1

Software1

Campaigns0

None recorded.

Procedure examples2

Groups1

Used byProcedure example
GroupUNC3886

UNC3886 has used vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to install malware and establish persistence across ESXi hypervisors.

Software1

Used byProcedure example
MalwareVIRTUALPIE

VIRTUALPIE has been installed on VMware ESXi servers through malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).

References2

  1. Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022 Open source
    Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
  2. VMware VIBs Open source
    Kyle Gleed. (2011, September 13). What's in a VIB?. Retrieved March 27, 2025.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.