Technique.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.
In Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1199.
| Rule | Level | Log source |
|---|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 - User Restricted from Sending Email | medium | m365 / NULL |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Github Commit Changes In Master | Anomaly | NULL | GitHub Webhooks |
| Github Commit In Develop | Anomaly | NULL | GitHub Webhooks |
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupAPT28 | Once APT28 gained access to the DCCC network, the group then proceeded to use that access to compromise the DNC network. |
| GroupAPT29 | APT29 has compromised IT, cloud services, and managed services providers to gain broad access to multiple customers for subsequent operations. |
| GroupGOLD SOUTHFIELD | GOLD SOUTHFIELD has breached Managed Service Providers (MSP's) to deliver malware to MSP customers. |
| GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has used stolen API keys and credentials associated with privilege access management (PAM), cloud app providers, and cloud data management companies to access downstream customer environments. |
| GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has accessed internet-facing identity providers such as Azure Active Directory and Okta to target specific organizations. |
| GroupmenuPass | menuPass has used legitimate access granted to Managed Service Providers in order to access victims of interest. |
| GroupPOLONIUM | POLONIUM has used compromised credentials from an IT company to target downstream customers including a law firm and aviation company. |
| GroupRedCurl | RedCurl has gained access to a contractor to pivot to the victim’s infrastructure. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 gained access through compromised accounts at cloud solution partners, and used compromised certificates issued by Mimecast to authenticate to Mimecast customer systems. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
