Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
4815 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupMofang | Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious links included. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupMirrorFace | MirrorFace has embedded OneDrive URLs in emails leading to malicious file installation. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupLazyScripter | LazyScripter has used spam emails that contain a link that redirects the victim to download a malicious document. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupWindshift | Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with links to harvest credentials and deliver malware. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupLuminousMoth | LuminousMoth has sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious Dropbox download link. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupAPT42 | APT42 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has sent emails containing a link that appear to lead to an urgent notification from a government institution, at times using URL shorteners like cort[.]as, acortaurl[.]com, and gtly[.]to. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupEarth Lusca | Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails to potential targets that contained a malicious link. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupFIN4 | FIN4 has used spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts) containing malicious links. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupCobalt Group | Cobalt Group has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has sent phishing emails containing a link to an actor-controlled Google Drive document or other free online file hosting services. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupMolerats | Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupTransparent Tribe | Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupWIRTE | WIRTE has sent targeted spearphishing emails with malicious links directing victims to malware downloads. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has sent malicious URL links through email to victims. In some cases the URLs were shortened or linked to Word documents with malicious macros that executed PowerShells scripts to download Pupy. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupAPT33 | APT33 has sent spearphishing emails containing links to .hta files. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupFIN8 | FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupNIMBUS MANTICORE | NIMBUS MANTICORE has utilized malicious links in phishing emails that direct users to download a malicious payload. |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has sent phishing emails with invite links to fictitious meetings. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupEXOTIC LILY | EXOTIC LILY has used the e-mail notification features of legitimate file sharing services for spearphishing. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupFIN6 | FIN6 has used fake job advertisements sent via LinkedIn to spearphish targets. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupStorm-1811 | Storm-1811 has used Microsoft Teams to send messages and initiate voice calls to victims posing as IT support personnel. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupCURIUM | CURIUM has used social media to deliver malicious files to victims. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has used fake job advertisements and messages sent via social media to spearphish targets. Contagious Interview has also leveraged hiring websites to solicit victims. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview FamousChollima October 2024SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview October 2024Sekoia ClickFake 2025Validin Contagious Interview North Korea ClickFix January 2025 |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has used LinkedIn to send spearphishing links. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has used the legitimate mailing service Constant Contact to send phishing e-mails. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupDark Caracal | Dark Caracal spearphished victims via Facebook and Whatsapp. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupWindshift | Windshift has used fake personas on social media to engage and target victims. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupToddyCat | ToddyCat has sent loaders configured to run Ninja as zip archives via Telegram. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupMoonstone Sleet | Moonstone Sleet has used social media services to spear phish victims to deliver trojainized software. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound used various social media channels (such as LinkedIn) as well as messaging services (such as WhatsApp) to spearphish victims. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupAjax Security Team | Ajax Security Team has used various social media channels to spearphish victims. |
| T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has used social media sites such as LinkedIn to send malicious links to potential vicitims. |
| T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice |
GroupStorm-1811 | Storm-1811 has initiated voice calls with victims posing as IT support to prompt users to download and execute scripts and other tools for initial access. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupBlackByte | BlackByte has used services such as `anonymfiles.com` and `file.io` to exfiltrate victim data. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has leveraged Telegram API to exfiltrate stolen data. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupAPT28 | APT28 can exfiltrate data over Google Drive. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has used the Telegram API `sendMessage` to relay data on compromised devices. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupShinyHunters | ShinyHunters has used compromised Salesforce CRM (Customer Relationship Management) dashboards to exfiltrate bulk data. Additionally, ShinyHunters has used LimeWire, a file-sharing service, to showcase samples of stolen data. |
| T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
GroupAPT38 | APT38 has exfiltrated stolen credentials to actor-controlled infrastructure leveraging Telegram Bot API. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupIndrik Spider | Indrik Spider has exfiltrated data using Rclone or MEGASync prior to deploying ransomware. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts. Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for uploading victim system information. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupHAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites, including MEGA. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupMuddyWater | MuddyWater has attempted to exfiltrate data to Wasabi, a cloud storage service, using Rclone. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupFIN7 | FIN7 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has also exfiltrated archived files to cloud services such as Dropbox using `curl`. |
| T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
GroupZIRCONIUM | ZIRCONIUM has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.