Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
17136 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1021.005 VNC |
MalwareCarberp | Carberp can start a remote VNC session by downloading a new plugin. |
| T1021.005 VNC |
MalwareProton | Proton uses VNC to connect into systems. |
| T1021.005 VNC |
MalwareZxShell | ZxShell supports functionality for VNC sessions. |
| T1021.005 VNC |
MalwareWarzoneRAT | WarzoneRAT has the ability of performing remote desktop access via a VNC console. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
CampaignOperation MidnightEclipse | During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used WinRM to move laterally in targeted networks. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WinRM via PowerShell to execute commands and payloads on remote hosts. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has utilized the post-exploitation tool known as Evil-WinRM that uses PowerShell over Windows Remote Management (WinRM) for remote code execution. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
GroupChimera | Chimera has used WinRM for lateral movement. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
GroupWizard Spider | Wizard Spider has used Window Remote Management to move laterally through a victim network. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
GroupThreat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 has used WinRM to enable remote execution. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has leveraged `WMI` to move laterally within a compromised network via application servers and SQL servers. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
MalwareCobalt Strike | Cobalt Strike can use |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
ToolSILENTTRINITY | SILENTTRINITY tracks `TrustedHosts` and can move laterally to these targets via WinRM. |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management |
ToolBrute Ratel C4 | Brute Ratel C4 can use WinRM for pivoting. |
| T1021.007 Cloud Services |
CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used compromised Azure credentials for credential theft activity and lateral movement to on-premises systems. |
| T1021.007 Cloud Services |
GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has also leveraged pre-existing AWS EC2 instances for lateral movement and data collection purposes. |
| T1021.007 Cloud Services |
GroupStorm-0501 | Storm-0501 has used compromised Entra Connect Sync Server to move laterally within the victim environment. |
| T1021.007 Cloud Services |
GroupAPT29 | APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell. |
| T1021.007 Cloud Services |
MalwareMini Shai-Hulud | Mini Shai-Hulud has accessed and propagated to AWS EC2 instances via SSM Send-Command. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
GroupGamaredon Group | A Gamaredon Group file stealer has the capability to steal data from newly connected logical volumes on a system, including USB drives. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
GroupOilRig | OilRig has used Wireshark’s usbcapcmd utility to capture USB traffic. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
GroupTurla | Turla RPC backdoors can collect files from USB thumb drives. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
GroupAPT28 | An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareGravityRAT | GravityRAT steals files based on an extension list if a USB drive is connected to the system. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareAppleSeed | AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareCosmicDuke | CosmicDuke steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareAria-body | Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareCrimson | Crimson contains a module to collect data from removable drives. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareMachete | Machete can find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwarePrikormka | Prikormka contains a module that collects documents with certain extensions from removable media or fixed drives connected via USB. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareFLASHFLOOD | FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on removable media and copies them to a staging area. The default file types copied would include data copied to the drive by SPACESHIP. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareInvisiMole | InvisiMole can collect jpeg files from connected MTP devices. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareObliqueRAT | ObliqueRAT has the ability to extract data from removable devices connected to the endpoint. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareRemsec | Remsec has a package that collects documents from any inserted USB sticks. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareExplosive | Explosive can scan all .exe files located in the USB drive. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareRover | Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareCrutch | Crutch can monitor removable drives and exfiltrate files matching a given extension list. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareMgBot | MgBot includes modules capable of gathering information from USB thumb drives and CD-ROMs on the victim machine given a list of provided criteria. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareUSBStealer | Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, USBStealer collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareTajMahal | TajMahal has the ability to steal written CD images and files of interest from previously connected removable drives when they become available again. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareRamsay | Ramsay can collect data from removable media and stage it for exfiltration. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareFunnyDream | The FunnyDream FilePakMonitor component has the ability to collect files from removable devices. |
| T1025 Data from Removable Media |
MalwareBADNEWS | BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack | During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus payloads use AES-256 GCM cipher to encrypt data to include ICONICSTEALER and VEILEDSIGNAL. |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
CampaignC0015 | During C0015, the threat actors used Base64-encoded strings. |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used heavily obfuscated code with Industroyer in its Windows Notepad backdoor. |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
CampaignC0017 | During C0017, APT41 broke malicious binaries, including DEADEYE and KEYPLUG, into multiple sections on disk to evade detection. |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
GroupGALLIUM | GALLIUM used a modified version of HTRAN in which they obfuscated strings such as debug messages in an apparent attempt to evade detection. |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
GroupAPT3 | APT3 obfuscates files or information to help evade defensive measures. |
| T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding. Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format. Kimsuky has obfuscated strings using Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions that complicate static analysis. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.