Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
1213 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log |
Campaign2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team disabled event logging on compromised systems. |
| T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs |
CampaignOperation AkaiRyū | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace cleared Windows event logs post compromise. |
| T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, the threat actors deleted all Windows system and security event logs using `/Q /c wevtutil cl system` and `/Q /c wevtutil cl security`. |
| T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall |
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise | During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `netsh` to configure firewall rules that limited certain UDP outbound packets. |
| T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall |
CampaignLeviathan Australian Intrusions | Leviathan modified system firewalls to add two open listening ports on 9998 and 9999 during Leviathan Australian Intrusions. |
| T1686.002 Network Device Firewall |
Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries modified security settings within the victims Fortigate device, utilizing the native CLI. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries also disabled network traffic logging. |
| T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall |
CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign | During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 added rules to a victim's Windows firewall to set up a series of port-forwards allowing traffic to target systems. |
| T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall |
CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors used PowerShell to add and delete rules in the Windows firewall. |
| T1689 Downgrade Attack |
CampaignFrostyGoop Incident | During FrostyGoop Incident, the adversary downgraded firmware on victim devices in order to impair visibility into the process environment. |
| T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
CampaignRedPenguin | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware to clear the `HISTFILE` environmental variable and to inject into Junos OS processes to inhibit logging. |
| T1690 Prevent Command History Logging |
CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor included disabling logging on targeted Cisco ASA appliances. |
| T1699 Direct Prompt Injection |
CampaignAnthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary entered a prompt that claimed the user was an employee of a cybersecurity firm and that Claude was being used for defensive cybersecurity testing to authorize restricted operations. |
| T1699 Direct Prompt Injection |
CampaignAI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure | During the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure, the adversary abused Claude Code by utilizing a file-write operation within the prompt that created a `claude.md` file that contained a pre-written 1,084-line document containing penetration testing scripts that were used in the campaign. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.