Real-world descriptions of how a group, tool or campaign used a technique.
11608 examples
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1620 Reflective Code Loading |
ToolBrute Ratel C4 | Brute Ratel C4 has used reflective loading to execute malicious DLLs. |
| T1620 Reflective Code Loading |
ToolDonut | Donut can generate code modules that enable in-memory execution of VBScript, JScript, EXE, DLL, and dotNET payloads. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePikabot | Pikabot features several methods to evade debugging by analysts, including checks for active debuggers, the use of breakpoints during execution, and checking various system information items such as system memory and the number of processors. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareBumblebee | Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareTONESHELL | TONESHELL has leveraged custom exception handlers to hide code flow and stop execution of a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePUBLOAD | PUBLOAD has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. PUBLOAD has leveraged `OutputDebugStringW` and `OutputDebugStringA` functions. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareMafalda | Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareRaspberry Robin | Raspberry Robin leverages anti-debugging mechanisms through the use of |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareRustyWater | RustyWater has registered a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) to catch debugging efforts. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareDRATzarus | DRATzarus can use `IsDebuggerPresent` to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareDarkTortilla | DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as `DebuggerIsAttached` and `DebuggerIsLogging`. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareROKRAT | ROKRAT can check for debugging tools. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePlugX | PlugX has made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareLumma Stealer | Lumma Stealer has checked for debugger strings by invoking `GetForegroundWindow` and looks for strings containing “x32dbg”, “x64dbg”, “windbg”, “ollydbg”, “dnspy”, “immunity debugger”, “hyperdbg”, “debug”, “debugger”, “cheat engine”, “cheatengine” and “ida”. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwarePureCrypter | PureCrypter has the ability to call `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate checks the |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareLockBit 3.0 | LockBit 3.0 can check heap memory parameters for indications of a debugger and stop the flow of events to the attached debugger in order to hinder dynamic analysis. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareThiefQuest | ThiefQuest uses a function named |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareLatrodectus | Latrodectus has the ability to check for the presence of debuggers. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareSaint Bot | Saint Bot has used `is_debugger_present` as part of its environmental checks. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareBlack Basta | The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareStrelaStealer | StrelaStealer variants include functionality to identify and evade debuggers. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareXLoader | XLoader uses anti-debugging mechanisms such as calling `NtQueryInformationProcess` with `InfoClass=7`, referencing `ProcessDebugPort`, to determine if it is being analyzed. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareANELLDR | ANELLDR can call `ZwSetInformationThread` with the second argument set to `ThreadHideFromDebugger (0x11)` to evade being debugged. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareStealBit | StealBit can detect it is being run in the context of a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
ToolAsyncRAT | AsyncRAT can use the `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` function to detect the presence of a debugger. |
| T1622 Debugger Evasion |
MalwareVidar | Vidar has used the `IsDebuggerPresent` function to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim machine. |
| T1647 Plist File Modification |
MalwareCuckoo Stealer | Cuckoo Stealer can create and populate property list (plist) files to enable execution. |
| T1647 Plist File Modification |
MalwareXCSSET | In older versions, XCSSET uses the |
| T1648 Serverless Execution |
ToolPacu | Pacu can create malicious Lambda functions. |
| T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates |
ToolAADInternals | AADInternals can create and export various authentication certificates, including those associated with Azure AD joined/registered devices. |
| T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates |
ToolMimikatz | Mimikatz's `CRYPTO` module can create and export various types of authentication certificates. |
| T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates |
MalwareMini Shai-Hulud | Mini Shai-Hulud has collected victim client certificates to assist in signed authentication assertion with Azure environments. |
| T1651 Cloud Administration Command |
ToolPacu | Pacu can run commands on EC2 instances using AWS Systems Manager Run Command. |
| T1651 Cloud Administration Command |
ToolAADInternals | AADInternals can execute commands on Azure virtual machines using the VM agent. |
| T1652 Device Driver Discovery |
MalwareHOPLIGHT | HOPLIGHT can enumerate device drivers located in the registry at `HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM`. |
| T1652 Device Driver Discovery |
MalwareRemsec | Remsec has a plugin to detect active drivers of some security products. |
| T1652 Device Driver Discovery |
MalwareINC Ransomware | INC Ransomware can verify the presence of specific drivers on compromised hosts including Microsoft Print to PDF and Microsoft XPS Document Writer. |
| T1653 Power Settings |
MalwareLine Dancer | Line Dancer can modify the crash dump process on infected machines to skip crash dump generation and proceed directly to device reboot for both persistence and forensic evasion purposes. |
| T1653 Power Settings |
MalwareLine Runner | Line Runner used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger victim devices to reboot, in the process unzipping and installing the Line Dancer payload. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
MalwareDUSTTRAP | DUSTTRAP can identify infected system log information. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
MalwareMegazord | Megazord has the ability to print the trace, debug, error, info, and warning logs. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
MalwareBeaverTail | BeaverTail has identified .ldb and .log files stored in browser extension directories for collection and exfiltration. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
MalwareAkira _v2 | Akira _v2 can enumerate the trace, debug, error, info, and warning logs on targeted systems. |
| T1654 Log Enumeration |
ToolPacu | Pacu can collect CloudTrail event histories and CloudWatch logs. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
MalwareInvisibleFerret | InvisibleFerret has searched the victim device credentials and files commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
MalwareBeaverTail | BeaverTail has searched the victim device for browser extensions commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets. ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025Esentire ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2024PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024Recorded Future Contagious Inteview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret OtterCookie February 2025 |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate can deploy payloads capable of capturing credentials related to cryptocurrency wallets. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
MalwareGlassWorm | GlassWorm has the ability to steal credentials for cryptocurrency wallets. |
| T1657 Financial Theft |
MalwareEmbargo | Embargo has been leveraged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, to prompt victims to pay a ransom. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.